“Türk Khaganate — The Encyclopedia of Empire” — Soren Stark (2016)

 

Türk Khaganate

 

The Encyclopedia of Empire, 2016

 

SOREN STARK

 

Institute for the Study of the Ancient World, New York University, USA

 

ETHNOGENESIS AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE TÜRK

The early, pre-imperial history of the Türk is sparsely illuminated by Chinese sources, first of all various official dynastic histories (Zhoushu, Beishi, Suishu; see Liu 1958). These reports — to some degree drawing on various myths of origin, current among the Türk — reflect a complicated and still not well-understood ethnogenesis of the Türk as the core group (Old Turkic: bodun) of their future empire. It is clear, however, that at the very beginning of the political history of the Türk stands the gradual rise of the Ashinas clan to imperial power as the royal clan of the Türk (Liu 1958: 40; Klyashtornyi 1964: 101–116; Sinor 1990; Golden 1992: 115–141). Curiously, there are some indications that the Ashinas themselves did not originate from the Inner Asian Turkic steppes but had a strong connection with — if not ultimately origins — in Eastern Turkestan and the borderlands of Gansu and Ningxia (Golden 2006: 143). According to the Suishu report about the Türk (Tujue in Chinese), the Ashinas (Ashina) were originally “mixed hu barbarians” (za hu), living in eastern Gansu (Liu 1958: 40). Although the meaning of the term hu is notoriously ill defined in Chinese sources, in this specific combination it probably refers to the linguistic and cultural complexity of the borderlands of Gansu, Ningxia, and northwestern Shaanxi. Apparently, the Ashinas maintained ties with the ruling clan in the area (which claimed Xiongnu descent to legitimate its power among pastoralists in the frontier zone) close enough to induce the Ashinas, together with some 500 households, to follow their “Xiongnu” masters to Gaochang/Turfan after Gansu fell to the Tuoba Xianbei in 439. Finally, these Ashinas families became subjects of the Rouran/ Avars, the then masters of the Inner Asian steppes when the latter conquered Gaochang in 460. According to the testimony of Chinese sources, the Ashinas supposedly served the Rouran as “iron workers” and “blacksmith slaves” in the southern Altai (Liu 1958: 5, 7, 40) — though it seems more likely that they acted there as agents of the Rouran, conquering and subsequently controlling a local Altaian population which specialized in iron metallurgy (Golden 1992: 126). Be that as it may, during the decades between 460 and 552 decisive ethnogenetic processes took place that finally resulted in the emergence of the Türk as a distinct grouping with their own political institutions and ethnic traditions, led by the Ashinas lineage.

 

It is clear from our sources that the power and the political aspirations of the Ashinas-Türk gradually rose during the 530s and 540s under the leadership of a certain Bumïn, who had inherited from his father the title of a “Great-Yabghu” (yabghu was an old title, long in use in Gansu and in the oases of the Tarim basin). Two factors seem to have facilitated their rapid rise to political prominence: access to iron (resulting in an ample supply for weapons) and their ability to obtain commodities from China (and maybe also from Eastern Turkestan). Perhaps the specific background of the Ashinas as foreigners, as “men of the border,” experienced and perhaps still connected with the oasis areas of Eastern Turkestan up to the Chinese borderlands in Gansu and Ningxia, turned into a strategic advantage as it helped to attract followers and to create alliances. Of decisive importance was a political alliance (including a trade agreement) which the Türk managed to negotiate in 545 with the Northern Wei. With that they effectively bypassed their overlords, the Rouran (Avars), and induced additional clans and tribes to rally under their banners. The result was the formation of the Türk as a polity.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TÜRK EMPIRE

In or shortly after 546, the Türk crushed a major revolt of Tiele tribes on behalf of the Rouran. As a reward, the Türk leader Bumïn requested in 551 the hand of a Rouran princess from his overlord, the Rouran Khagan Anagui — a request that was denied (Liu 1958: 7, 41). Apparently the Rouran/Avars did not wish to lend formal legitimization to Bumïn’s growing power by letting him become an in-law member of their charismatic royal clan (rendered Yujiulü in Chinese). Frustrated in his political ambitions, Bumïn broke with his overlord and rose in open rebellion (Drompp 2005: 103).

 

Supported by the Western Wei (who had by then entered a marriage alliance with the Ashinas-Türk), Bumïn inflicted a devastating defeat upon the Rouran/Avars in late March/early April 552 in what is now eastern Inner Mongolia, causing Anagui to commit suicide. Now Bumïn himself assumed the imperial title “khagan” (qaghan) as Ellig Khagan (Yili Kehan, in Chinese rendering) — “the realm-having Khagan.” Thus, supreme power in the steppes had passed to the Türk and their ruling clan, the Ashinas.

 

It seems that right from its very inception, Türk rule over Central Eurasia emerged in a somewhat bipartite structure, with an eastern and a western “wing,” both ruled by khagans (Sinor 1990:297–298; Golden 1992: 131). The eastern wing was centered in present-day Mongolia and Inner Mongolia and enjoyed political primacy, with its khagan considered the senior of the two. Consequently, rule over the east fell first to Bumïn himself, and then — after his death in March 553 — to his eldest son Qara (Keluo) as Yixiji Khagan. The exceptional economic potential the Türk had reached already at this early point becomes clear from the passing notice that in April 553, shortly after his accession to power, Qara was able to trade 50 000 horses with the Western Wei alone — a deal worth several hundred thousand silk bolts. On January 20, 554 Qara won another victory over the Rouran/Avars before he also died, succeeded by his younger brother Yandou, who held the title of an *Erkin (sejin) and now took the ambitious title “God(like) Muxan Khagan” as senior khagan of the eastern wing of the Türk Khaganate. Muxan continued the war against the remnants of the Rouran/Avars, inflicting further defeats upon them. Finally, in the winter of 554/555 they were left with no choice but to flee from the steppes with some 1000 households and take refuge with the Northern Zhou. But this did not save them, as the Türk were destined to physically annihilate the entire ruling house of the Rouran/Avars — apparently its very existence continued to pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of Türk hegemony in the steppe world. Thus, some 3000 Rouran were finally handed over to the Türk, who executed them directly outside the Northern Zhou capital, Chang’an (Liu 1958: 35-36).

 

To avoid the same fate, other members of the ruling clan of the Rouran/Avars (or more or less legitimate heirs of it) had in the meantime fled the Türk onslaught westward across the length of the Asian continent. As they too still adhered to the imperial title khagan, it was inevitable that the Türk would pursue and attempt to annihilate them — a task which Bumïn entrusted to his younger brother Istemi. The territories and peoples Istemi conquered and subdued in pursuit of this goal eventually became the western wing of the Türk Empire, ruled by Istemi as subordinate “Sir [Śri] Yabghu Khagan.”

 

The territorial expansion of the Türk polity into an empire extending from Manchuria in the east to Crimea in the west took place with breathtaking swiftness (Sinor 1990: 297–301; Golden 1992: 127–131). Already in 554 or 555 Muxan had subdued the Tuyuhun (in present-day Qinghai), and later he mounted successful campaigns against the Qitañ in the east and the Qïrghïz in the northwest. His uncle Istemi seems to have turned immediately westward, allying himself with the Sasanian great-king (who married his daughter) against the Hephthalites — old allies of the Rouran/Avars. The decisive battle — supposedly waged for eight hours — was fought near Bukhara in 558 or 559, and ended in a disastrous defeat for the Hephthalites. As a result, the rich cities of Sogdiana and their fertile hinterland fell under Türkic sway and became the staging area for future raids by Türk armies into Sasanian Khorasan.

 

Further pursuing the Rouran/Avars on their flight westward, the Türk vanguards finally reached the steppes north of the Caucasus, from where they dispatched a first embassy to Constantinople in July 563. This first encounter was soon followed by a large-scale diplomatic rapprochement with Byzantium, instigated by Istemi himself — apparently with a threefold objective. to negotiate a profitable trade agreement enabling the Türk to fully capitalize on the large quantities of silk they continued to extract from China; to enter a military alliance against Sasanian Iran (with which relationships had turned sour following an Iranian embargo on Türk silk); and to extradite the Türk’s arch-enemies, the Rouran/Avars, who had sought refuge in Byzantium’s neighborhood on the lower Danube. The first embassy from Istemi (whose title “Sir Yabghu” was distorted to “Silzaboulos” in Byzantium) was led by a Sogdian named Maniax and reached Constantinople in late 568 or early 569. By that time most of the various Oghur tribes inhabiting the Western Eurasian steppes seem to have come under Türk dominion. Although in the following eight years a lively diplomatic exchange ensued between the two powers (with at least six embassies from Byzantium to the Türk and at least one more from the Türk to Constantinople), not much resulted from these contacts: the Byzantines remained cautious about the powerful new masters of Inner Eurasia and showed little interest in buying their expensive silk as they had just started their own silk production. As a result Türk—Byzantine relations soon cooled while the Türk continued their advance into the Caucasus and the Pontic steppes by subduing the Alans and the Onoghurs (Blockley 1985: 110–127, 170–179; Sinor 1990: 301–305; Golden 1992: 128–130; Dobrovits 2011).

 

In 572 Muxan Khagan died in the east and was succeeded by his younger brother who ruled with the title “God(like)” Magha Tatpar Khagan (Mohetabo Kehan in Chinese rendering) as supreme khagan over the Türk Empire. Slightly later, in 576, Istemi also passed away and his son Tardu (called Datou in the Chinese sources) assumed leadership of the western wing of the Türk. During the 570s Ashinas rule reached its apogee: in the east, Tatpar Khagan even contemplated the conquest of the state of the Northern Zhou. He was finally appeased by the enormous annual “gift” of 100 000 bolts of silk, and a comparable value of “presents” was received at the same time from the Northern Zhou’s rivals, the Northern Qi. In the south the Türk conquered the territories up to the Hindukush (Tokharestan), exacted heavy yearly tributes from the Sasanians (according to Theophylaktos Simokattes), while in the west Türk forces even managed to capture the Byzantine town of Bosporus (Kerch) by c. 579 ce. 

THE DIVISION OF THE TÜRK EMPIRE

 

Tatpar Khagan was the last surviving son of Bumïn Khagan. In a political milieu of predominantly lateral succession (from elder brother to younger brother), it was clear that his death would lead to a generational change at the top of the khaganate, a situation that could easily lead to conflict between competing members of the royal lineage. To counter this, Tatpar promoted his own son Anluo as his successor and tried to present him favorably in comparison to his rival cousins — all of them sons of former senior khagans (Liu 1958: 43–44; Stark 2008: 305–306). Nonetheless, when Tatpar died in 581, Anluo did not enjoy enough prestige among the Türks to successfully make his bid for supreme leadership. He was quickly outmaneuvered by his two senior rivals, Shetu, son of Qara (Yixiji) Khagan, with his headquarters south of the Gobi in lucrative proximity to China, and Daluobian, son of Muxan, who had his base in the so-called “Northern Headquarters.”

 

For a short time Shetu succeeded in being acknowledged as supreme khagan, assuming the title El Külüg Shad Magha Ishbara Qaghan (Yili Julu She Mohe Shiboluo Kehan, in Chinese rendering, mostly known as Shabolüe Khagan), with Daluobian (Apa Qaghan/Abo, in Chinese rendering) and Anluo (Magha Umna Qaghan) being lesser khagans. However, after a series of natural disasters and military defeats against the rising Sui, tensions among the various khagans arose: in 582 Tardu refused to join Shabolüe’s army in a campaign against the Sui. The following year tensions between Apa and Ishbara escalated into open conflict and in 583 Apa was forced to seek refuge with his uncle Tardu, son of Istemi and khagan over the Western Türk (Chavannes 1903: 13–14; Liu 1958: 49; Sinor 1990: 305–306; Golden 1992: 131–132). Tardu supposedly assisted his nephew with an army of 100 000 soldiers (Liu 1958: 49, which might be understood as a chiffre for the ten tümen of the Western Türk — see below). Apparently Apa managed to establish himself at the head of some 5000–6000 followers in Dzungaria, as his emissaries seem to have been regulars in nearby Gaochang/Turfan (where they are mentioned in two provisions lists from tomb TAM307 in Astana). Apa’s following and power gradually increased as his headquarters became a refuge for other prominent members of the Ashinas clan who were discontented with Ishbara. In all likelihood he also took the command of Tardu’s tribes when the latter — perhaps after a “rebellion” of “Khotan, Persia, and the Hephthalites” —was forced to flee to the Sui court in the spring of 584 (Liu 1958: 67). The following year, even Ishbara was forced to turn to China for help, leaving him no choice but to declare himself a vassal of the Sui something previously unheard of from any Türk ruler. When Ishbara/Shabolüe died in 587, the houses of Qara and Muxan stood against each other in open conflict, turning the original two wings of the Ashinas-Türk Khaganate into mutually hostile polities. Divided by internal strife and quarrels, the Türk had lost much of their former potential to threaten their neighbors — particularly China, recently united by the Sui.

 

After Ishbara’s death, supreme rule over the eastern wing passed to his younger brother Chuluohou, who resided south of the Gobi desert and assumed the title Magha Khagan (Mohe Kehan, in Chinese rendering). Magha Khagan must have been an energetic and skilled ruler, as he finally managed to capture Apa in the same year (Chavannes 1903: 14; Liu 1958: 55). Apparently Magha Khagan attempted to establish his supremacy over the entire Türk Empire (including the western tribes) by embarking on a large-scale campaign against Sasanian Iran. However, this attempt failed spectacularly in late 588, when “the supreme ruler of the Türk” (al-Tabari) lost his life in a major battle near Herat, as reported independently by Arab and Chinese sources.

 

With Chinese support Yongyulu, son of Ishbara and previously Yabghu Khagan (that is, a lesser khagan) of the northeast, managed to establish himself as senior khagan of the eastern wing (with the title Xiejia Shiduona Dulan Khagan). But in order to avoid a renewed concentration of power in a single person among the Türk in the east, the Sui were quick to give additional support to the son of Chuluohou, Rangan (as Tuli Khagan), by granting him a Chinese princess in marriage, supplying him “with a lot of money and provisions” (Suishu), and building him a new residence at the Türk’s old center of power south of the Gobi desert. Well calculated by Sui diplomacy, the preferential treatment of Rangan soon led to a falling out between Rangan and Dulan who perceived such treatment as a violation of his rank as senior khagan of the east. Finally, Rangan was forced to seek refuge in the Ordos, south of the Yellow River, where he was given pasture grounds and the title Yili Zhendou Qimin as puppet-khagan by the grace of the Sui.

 

In the west it seems that after Magha Khagan’s failure to secure his hold there, Tardu was able to return from exile in Sui territories to his former home base. In the following years he appears as an ally of Dulan Khagan in the east. But Tardu could only re-establish control over the western part of his former realm (i.e., the Chu and Talas area), while the eastern part was still controlled by a member of the house of Muxan, namely Apa’s nephew who took the title Niri Khagan and had his headquarters in the Ili region. In 595, after a victory over Dulan Khagan in the east, Niri made a bid for supreme power among the Türk, proclaiming himself “great khagan” (according to the inscription from Xiao Hongnahai/Mongolküre) and even sending an embassy to Constantinople, but he appears to have died shortly afterward in 598 or 599 (see La Vaissière 2010 who suggests a different date for his death).

 

This was a turning point for the fortunes of Tardu, and after the unexpected murder of Dulan Khagan in the east in 599 he was suddenly in a position to aspire to supreme rule among the Türk and adopted the title Bilge Khagan (Bujia Kehan). To assert his claim, he started to raid Sui territories and pressed hard on his only remaining rival khagan, Rangan/TuIi Kehan, who was soon forced to flee to the Sui who subsequently installed him as puppet-khagan (with the title Yili Zhendou Qimin Kehan) at Dali (south of present-day Houhot in Inner Mongolia). However, Tardu’s aspirations came to a sudden end in 603 when a large-scale Tiele/Oghur uprising forced him to flee to the Tuyuhun, after which nothing more is heard of him in the surviving sources (Liu 1958: 108). From then on, the Türk remained politically divided into two competing polities. Supreme rule over the east remained with the offspring of Magha Khagan from the house of Qara, and until his death in 609 Qimin Khagan proved to be a faithful subject of the Sui. In the west, the son of Niri, Daman, ascended the throne as Churi Khagan (Nijue Chuluo Kehan, in Chinese rendering), but proved unable to cope with another TieIe/Oghur uprising (in 605) and the diplomatic intrigues of the Sui. The latter openly supported Shekui, grandson of Tardu, and in 611 Daman was finally forced to take permanent refuge at the Chinese court, leaving the throne to Shekui (Chavannes 1903: 14–19). From now on, supreme rule over the Western Türk remained with members of the house of Istemi.

 

THE CONSOLIDATION OF A WESTERN AND AN EASTERN TÜRK EMPIRE

 

Both the Eastern and the Western Türk profited greatly from the rapid decline of Sui hegemony after 612, regaining considerable strength. In the east, the son of Qimin, Shibi Khagan, adopted — after a Sui diplomatic plot against his rule had failed — a hostile attitude toward China and resumed raiding the Chinese borderlands. With the help of skilled Sogdian advisors and diplomats he was able to revive the power of the Türk in the east and especially vis-à-vis China. After the disintegration of the Sui he patronized several competing Chinese warlords, including Li Yuan who finally established the Tang dynasty in 618 but remained tributary to the Eastern Türk throughout his reign as emperor (Liu 1958: 65–66, 87–88, 129–131, 132–133, 181–182). Thus, after Shibi had died in 619, this newly strengthened polity was, for the time being, continued by his younger brothers: first, briefly, Chuluo Khagan, and then Ellig (Xiele) Khagan who ruled the Eastern Türk from 620.

 

The Western Türk under Shekui were also able to capitalize on the decline of the Sui by gradually replacing them as overlords of the various principalities of the Tarim Basin. Thus, when Shekui died in 618, Western Türk suzerainty reached as far as the Altai in the northeast and the Caucasus in the west, and encompassed all the oasis principalities from the Chinese border at Dunhuang westward (Chavannes 1903: 23–24, 51–52). His successor, Ton Yabghu (Tong Yehu) Khagan, turned his attention particularly to the rich oasis territories in the west — to Sogdiana and Tokharestan: not only did all of the petty princes there now receive formal investiture from the Western Türk great khagan as “elteber” (for the title see below), but the khagan also sent his officials (tudun) “in order to supervise and to rule them, and to control the taxes and tariffs (for the Türk) there” (Tangshu; see Stark 2008: 220–221). In Tokharestan he established his son Tardu as Yabghu — as liege lord over all the petty princes between the Iron Gates and the Hindukush, with Western Türk power reaching now as far south as Gandhara. As a consequence Ton Yabghu moved the main headquarters of the Western Türk further west, from the Ili valley to the Chu and Talas valleys (Chavannes 1903: 24, 52), supported by farmers and craftsmen from the local Sogdian colonies there. In the west, the Western Türk campaigned under the command of Ziebel (an elder brother of Ton) in 625 and 627/28 as far as northwestern Iran, plundering Tiflis and, as allies of the Byzantines, defeating the Sasanians (Golden 1992: 135). In the east, Ton Yabghu was able to capitalize on the intensifying conflict between the Eastern Türk and the Tang who promised him a Tang princess in marriage — a promise, however, that was never fulfilled: although Western Türk power had reached its apogee, Ton Yabghu’s rule was increasingly unpopular among his tribal subjects as well as his own relatives. Thus, when in 628 the Qarluq (in the Altai and in the Tarbaghatai) rose in revolt against Ton Yabghu, his elder brother Ziebel made his bid for power and killed him (Chavannes 1903: 24), provoking a period of political crisis and protracted conflicts between various tribal factions among the Western Türk.

 

CRISIS AND DECLINE: TANG TRIUMPH OVER THE TÜRK

 

The Tiele/Oghur revolts around 600 — stirred perhaps by increased taxation of the Türk’s nomadic subjects in order to make up for the loss of revenues from China — had resulted in a weakening of the Türk’s grip on the tribes in the north. Federations like the Xueyantou in Central and Northern Mongolia and the (Three) Qarluqs in the Altai-Tarbaghatai had in the first quarter of the 7th century gradually grown into formidable rivals. In order to counter this growing pressure within the steppe world, Ellig/Xiele, khagan of the Eastern Türk, implemented a strategy of yearly large-scale plundering expeditions into Shanxi and the northern border areas of Guanzhong. In 626 the khagan led an expeditionary force all the way to the north bank of the Wei River, only a few miles from the capital Chang’an (Liu 1958: 139–140, 190–191; Skaff 2012: 186). At the same time he systematically favored Sogdians as confidants, advisors, and high-ranking administrators of the state at the expense of his own relatives, perhaps in attempting to bypass the political influence of the Ashinas clan and other tribal elites, decisively limiting central power among the Türk (Stark 2008: 303–310). However, this strategy proved increasingly ineffective with the rapid rise of the military power of China, recently reunited under the Tang. In addition, in 627 heavy snowfalls in the steppes decimated the nomads’ livestock on a grand scale, and when the Türk commandeered horses needed for their Chinese campaigns from their hard-pressed subject tribes, this caused political unrest so that by summer 628 many of the subordinate tribes of the Türk were in open revolt (Liu 1958: 194). At the same time, Ellig’s policy favoring Sogdians now backfired, as it induced numerous high-ranking members of his own clan — including junior khagans — to defect to the Tang. By autumn 629 the Tang had finished their large-scale preparations for a counterattack on Ellig’s Türk, accelerated since Taizong had taken power in 626.

 

Being an experienced and talented field-commander himself, Taizong ordered the final offensive to begin in December 629, spearheaded by fast-moving units of light cavalry resembling those of the Türk themselves. To attack the Türk in the middle of winter was a shrewd and unexpected move, and the massive attack took the Eastern Türk completely by surprise. In March 630 the khagan’s camp near a place called the Iron Mountains was taken in a surprise attack (in fact, during peace negotiations) and Ellig managed to escape with only a handful of followers. This broke the Eastern Türk’s resistance: most Türk commanders surrendered to the Tang, and finally, in May 630, one of them — Ellig’s uncle Ashinas Sunishi — handed the khagan over to the Tang (Graff 2002). Ellig was brought to Chang’an where he spent the remaining four years of his life in captivity, living in a tent set up for him in the imperial city and — so we are told by Chinese accounts — “singing sad songs and weeping” (Tangshu). The remainder of Ellig’s former tribes were resettled in the Chinese border provinces, closely controlled by the Tang, while many members of the Ashinas clan went on to have successful military careers in Tang service. In imitation of a steppe ruler, Taizong took the title of a Tian Kehan (lit. “heavenly khagan”), a claim that was apparently widely acknowledged (Pan 1997). Thus ended, for the time being, the eastern khaganate (qaghanate) of the Türk.

At the same time, the Western Türk were embroiled in fierce conflicts between various Ashinas contenders, supported by different tribal fractions (Chavannes 1903: 26–32, 54–60). After Ziebel had murdered his brother Ton Yabghu in 627 and declared himself Moheduo (Maghatur) Si Quli Sipi Dulu Khagan, he failed to receive recognition from one of these factions, the Nushibi — a coalition of five army units forming the western wing of the Western Türk Qaghanate (roaming the area of the khaganal residences at the Chu and Talas rivers). They finally chose the son of Ton Yabghu (with the title Yipi Boluo Si Yehu Kehan/Sir Yabghu Khagan) as khagan. Both contenders were quick to reach out for support to the Tang by requesting a Tang princess in marriage, but their requests were both refused. Although Sir Yabghu was finally able to win the support of most leaders of the Western Türk, forcing Ma-ghatur/Ziebel to flee to the Altai (where he perished), Ton’s son failed to establish a lasting authority over the Western Türk: after an unsuccessful campaign against the Xueyantuo-Tiele and because of his heavy-handed policy against his own dignitaries, Sir Yabghu was soon facing a revolt of Nushibi and other Western Türk leaders and had to seek refuge in Samarkand, where he died soon afterward.

In his stead a “quriltay” elected Nishu, a cousin of Sir Yabghu as Dulu Khagan. He was apparently widely popular among the Western Türk, and on good terms with the Tang (his father had been a blood brother of Li Shimin, now ruling as Taizong). In 632 Dulu received, at his own request, official confirmation from the Tang, together with a lavish gift of silks and insignia of power, which helped to consolidate his rule. After his death in 634 he was succeeded by his younger brother Shabolüo (Ishbara) Dielishi Khagan. Chinese sources credit Ishbara Dielishi with the introduction of the decimal system among the Western Türk by dividing them into ten army units called “arrows” (O Türk. oq) — the five Nushibi “arrows” forming the western wing, west of the important city and khaganal residence of Suyab, and the five Dulu “arrows” as the eastern wing, east of Suyab. However, elements ofa decimal organization among the Western Türk might in fact go back to the very founder of AshinasTürk power in the west, Istemi Khagan.

Despite these attempts to institutionalize his rule, Ishbara Dielishi did not enjoy the same authority as his brother before him. After several revolts, he had to be content with rule over only the western, Nushibi, wing. In the east in 638, the Dulu elected a certain Yugu shad as Yipi Dulu Khagan, residing west of mount Zuhe (perhaps the Tarbaghatai?) whose rule extended well into southern Siberia as far as the Qirghiz in the Minusinsk basin and the Basmil in the Sayan. Only a year later Dielishi was toppled and forced to flee to Ferghana where he died. In his stead the Nushibi leaders elected one of his nephews, who was installed as Yipi ShaboIüo (Ishbara) Yehu (Yabghu) Khagan, but in 641 he was betrayed by one of his own officials, the Tudun of Chach, handed over to Dulu, and finally killed. In an attempt to take over the former domains of Ishbara Yabghu, Dulu campaigned in person as far as Tokharestan but soon forfeited his own rule: behind him the Nushibi instigated a revolt and invested a grandson of Dielishi as Yipi Shekui Khagan, who was subsequently recognized by the Tang. In a surprise attack Shegkui defeated Dulu near Isfijab (modern Sayram), forcing him to retreat into Tokharestan. In subsequent years Shekui was able to stabilize his rule, largely relying on support from the Tang. In 648 he extended his sway far into the northeast, into the Tarbagatai area, forcing Ashina Helu — a former Yabghu of Dulu over the Qarluq and other Tiele tribes — into exile in China. Shekui’s Sinophile policy culminated in renunciation of Türk supremacy over the principalities of Kucha, Khotan, Kashghar, and Kharghalik in the western Tarim basin (supposedly as bride-wealth for a Chinese princess). This must have caused widespread discontent among his own kin and tribesmen, and when Taizong died in 650 Shekui’s old foe Helu seized the opportunity, deserted the Tang with his remaining forces, and assumed supreme power over the Dulu and Nushipi tribes of the Western Türk as Ishbara Qaghan (Chavannes 1903: 32–33, 59–60).

With this, Tang—Western Türk relations had suddenly changed from friendly to openly hostile, and, unified by a talented and popular khagan, the Türk immediately started raiding the Anxi Protectorate of the Tang in Dzungaria and the Tarim basin. The major Tang counter-attack took place only in 657/58, ingeniously planned and carried out by the new supreme commander of all the Tang forces and their nomadic allies in the west, Su Dingfang, who was highly competent and experienced in warfare with the Türk. He devised an equally ambitious and unconventional scheme, attacking the Türk with a pincer movement from the northeast, through the Gobi-Altai and the Tarbagatai (led by himself and supported by a sizeable Uyghur force) and from the southeast, through the Tianshan (led by two high-ranking Ashinas princes in Tang service and personal enemies of Helu). Helu’s forces were annihilated in three battles, causing the khagan to flee to Chach where he was finally betrayed by one of his commanders and, in 658, handed over to the Tang vanguard that had pursued him on his flight westward (Chavannes 1903: 36–37, 63–65).

 

While Helu was carried off to Chang’an as a war captive, his former tribes were divided into two protectorates, and the two Ashinas princes who had rendered valuable services in defeating Helu were each rewarded with the command over one of them: the Nushibi tribes in the west were turned into the protectorate Mengchi with Ashinas Buzhen as their protector-general residing in Suyab just west of the Chu River, while the Dulu tribes now formed the protectorate Kunling with its center in the middle Ili valley and Ashinas Mishe as protector-general. Although both Ashinas princes were, in reality, hardly more than marionettes, appointed to guarantee Tang authority over the Western Türk and largely dependent on Tang support, they still received formal investiture as khagans from their tribesmen. This reflected the monopoly that the Ashinas lineage still widely enjoyed in exerting rule within the nomadic world of the Eurasian steppes. Thus, although independent Ashinas rule over the Western Türk de facto ended by 658, it took another 40 years until Ashinas rule in the west also de jure came to an end, when in 699 a certain Wuzhile, leader (Magha Tarqan) of the Türgesh (one of the five Dulu tribes of the “Ten arrows”), revolted against his overlord Ashina Huseluo (ruling the on oq for the Chinese as Jiezhong Shizhu Khagan), forcing him to seek Chinese protection in Dzungaria together with some 60 000–70 000 followers. However, the Chinese administration still maintained the fiction of Ashinas rule over the Western Türk for some decades longer. In 739 the Tang tried to overcome the Türgesh by installing a certain Ashinas Xin, the largely Sinicized great-grandson of Buzhen and a descendant of Istemi in the eighth generation, as their puppet “khagan of the Ten Tribes” — an enterprise that quickly failed. It remained the last attempt of an Ashinas to strive for khaganal power over the former tribes of the Western Türk (Stark 2006/2007).

 

REVIVAL AND TERMINAL DECLINE IN THE EAST: THE LATE EASTERN TÜRK (KÖK TÜRK)

 

In the east, however, the Ashinas succeeded in making an impressive return to power (Liu 1958: 158–180, 212–231; Tekin 1968; Sinor 1990: 310–313; Golden 1992: 137–138). Taking advantage of the temporary weakness of China in the later years of Gaozong, a certain Ashinas Qutlugh Tudun Chor, a distant descendant of Ellig Khagan, defected in the winter of 682/683 from the Yunzhong area command in northern Shanxi to the Yinshan/Choghay mountains. Here he quickly gathered a following among discontented tribesmen and members of prominent Türk clans, such as Ashide Yuanzhen/Tonyuquq. Of paramount importance for the successful outcome of this revolt was the fact that Qutlugh succeeded in subduing the Tiele federation of the “Nine Tribes” (Toquz Oghuz) north of the Gobi, which substantially added to the resources at his disposal. It was here, in the steppes north of the Gobi, at the Orkhon and the Tola rivers, that the Türk polity was now centered, with Qutlugh being elected as Elterish Khagan over the Kök Türk (lit. the “Blue,” i.e., the “Eastern Türk”), as they called themselves in their runic inscriptions. The tactical retreat from the Yinshan mountains proved to be a shrewd step: on the one hand it still allowed the highly mobile forces of the Türk to raid China’s northern borderlands almost every year, profiting from the political turmoil at the court after the death of Gaozong in 683; and on the other hand, the camps of the Türk were now much more difficult to reach for Chinese punitive expeditions than before.

 

When Elterish Qaghan died in 692, he was succeeded without any difficulties by his younger brother Ashina Mochuo as Qapaghan Khagan. Qapaghan continued his brother’s policy of raiding but he also opened diplomatic channels to the Chinese court by sending envoys and receiving gifts and honorific titles. When in 696 the Chinese were threatened by a major Qitañ revolt, it was Qapaghan’s Türk who came to their aid and inflicted a major defeat on the Qitañ rebels.

 

In return Qapaghan demanded the extradition of several thousand households of Türk and Sogdians (together with large amounts of grain, agricultural implements, and iron) from the Ordos region to Mongolia in order to enlarge his army and further strengthen his home base. With increased forces the Türk soon resumed heavy raiding in northern China, now under the pretext of returning rule over China to the Li family. The ultimate aim of Qapaghan was apparently nothing less than the full restoration of Ashinas hegemony in Central Eurasia: already in 699 he charged his own son with the reconquest of the former western wing of the Türk by installing him as khagan over the “Ten arrows” (on oq), with the telling title “khagan who reconquers the west.” Conquered people like the Toquz Oghuz and the Qitañ became subject populations, owing heavy taxes and services to their new masters. Ensuing rebellions like those of the Qarluq, Az, Izgil, or Bayïrqu were brutally subdued. In 710 fraternal strife among the Türgesh finally provided the opportunity to reconquer the west, and their devastating defeat (in the same area where some 50 years earlier Helu was defeated by the Tang) paved the way for a full-scale invasion of the lands of the “Ten arrows” in 711 at Ili, Chu, and Talas. With this, the Türk Empire was briefly restored to unity and hegemonic power over Central Eurasia. The following year a Türk expeditionary army even appeared before the gates of Samarkand, raiding as far as the lower Syr-Darya and the Iron Gates between Sogdiana and Tokharestan, until it was put to flight in spring 713 by the energetic and skilled Arab general-governor of Khorasan, Qutaybah ibn Muslim.

 

Türk reunification came to an abrupt end in May 716, however, when Qapaghan was unexpectedly killed in an ambush on his return from an otherwise successful punitive expedition against the Bayïrqu in Transbaikalia. The ensuing war of succession between the son of Qapaghan on the one side, and the two sons of Elterish on the other, threw the khaganate into chaos again as many of the recently conquered peoples now took their opportunity and rose in open revolt. After a brief but bloody struggle, the sons of Elterish prevailed by massacring Qapaghan’s son, his entire family, and most of his followers. The older son of Elterish succeeded to the throne as Bilge Khagan, supported by his energetic younger brother who was, with the title Kül Tegin, invested with supreme command over the army. In the following years Bilge Khagan and Kül Tegin were forced to campaign almost continuously against rebellious subject peoples (especially the Toquz Oghuz), but they could not prevent the western tribes ultimately breaking away, rallying under the banners of the energetic Türgesh Khagan Sulu. In addition, the Tang in the south quickly regained much of their old strength during the early years of Emperor Xuanzong, which made profitable border raiding increasingly difficult. In 721 the Türk had no choice other than to conclude peace with the Tang, which at least secured them a steady income on the basis of a profitable silk-horse trade agreement. But Bilge Khagan’s repeated requests to receive a Chinese princess in marriage — an attempt to further his prestige in the steppe world — were never satisfied by the Tang.

 

In 731 Kül Tegin died and in 734 Bilge Khagan was poisoned. This opened the final chapter for the Türk Empire and Ashinas rule in Central Eurasia. The sources on the events that led to the final downfall of the Ashinas dynasty are contradictory. Apparently, various factions within the dynasty strove to have their respective candidates placed on the throne, so that several under-age sons of Bilge Khagan held the Khaganate consecutively. This power struggle further weakened the Türk’s grip on their subject tribes. Thus, when finally a high-ranking general ascended the throne as Qutlugh Yabghu Khagan, he faced a strong coalition of the Basmïl, Qarluq, and Uyghur tribes and was killed in battle in 742. He was briefly succeeded by one of his sons as Ozmïsh Khagan, who met the same fate as his father the following year. Finally, the remaining Türk elected another son of Qutlugh Bilge as Baimei Khagan — who turned out to be the last member of the Ashinas dynasty on the khaganal throne in Central Eurasia. He was killed in 744, unable to resist the rise of the Uyghurs, the leading tribe of the Toquz Oghuz, to hegemonic power over Inner Asia. We are told that his head was sent to the Tang emperor, who supposedly celebrated the final downfall of the once powerful masters of the Eurasian steppes by composing a poem (Liu 1958: 180, 231). Many members of the Ashinas clan, now facing the same fate as the ruling clan of the Rouran about 200 years earlier, fled to the Tang court where they received honorific titles and alimentation and subsequently disappear from the sources.

 

STRUCTURES AND LEGACY

 

Even a brief characterization of the Türk Empire’s structure is faced with several major difficulties. First, the bulk of information comes from written sources composed outside the steppes, and only for the period of the Ashinas revival in the east from after 682/683 do we have a substantial corpus of indige-nous epigraphic material in the form of the Turkic runic inscriptions (Tekin 1968). Data on the Türk’s political and social structures are thus only too often modeled along Chinese, Byzantine, or Middle Eastern concepts and standards of governance. Second, the very notion of nomadic statehood and its evolution is still a matter of considerable debate. The Türk Empire certainly meets Nicola Di Cosmo’s definition of a “steppe empire” as “a political formation that extended far beyond its original territorial or ethnic confines and embraced, by direct conquest or by the imposition of its political authority, a va-riety of peoples and lands that may have had different types of relations with the imperial center, consti-tuted by the imperial clan and by its charismatic leader” (Di Cosmo 2011: 44–45). Like other “steppe empires” before, the continuing existence of the Türk Empire was, after its foundation, dependent on the constant renewal of old political alliances and the creation of new ones, patron–client relationships, and acts of subjugation, with legitimate leadership reserved for the lineage responsible for the initial creation — the “royal lineage.” Consequently, a decisive ideological as well as structural hallmark of the Türk Empire was the principle of collective sovereignty, vesting legitimate rule over the Türkic realm (called “el” in the Turkic runic inscriptions) in the Ashinas clan. This meant that only members of the Türk’s royal clan could aspire to legitimate rule over the entire realm or its constituent parts. It seems that most male members of the Ashinas clan were assigned command over army units, subject tribes, or con-quered oasis territories (perhaps similar to the “apanage” system practiced by later Turkish and Mongol dynasties). As a consequence, every male member of the royal clan could — at least in principle — aspire to supreme rule, as long as he proved to be a successful and charismatic political and military leader.

 

Within the nomadic sphere of Central Eurasia the “el” of the Türk was predominantly composed of tribally organized communities called “bodun” in the runic texts (meaning “clans”), recognizable by individual ethnonyms. Each bodun was, in theory, divided into two dominant social estates: the nobility (begler) with their retinues and the lower-class freemen (qara bodun); in this context, slaves (qul and küng) were few and mostly employed domestically. The political and military core of the Türkic el was the Türk bodun, consisting of the ruling clan and its allies (who became in-law clans of the Ashinas). Scholars on “state formation” in nomadic societies of Central and Eastern Eurasia (such as Pritsak, Eberhardt, Wittvogel/Feng, Golden), regularly refer to such core groups as “Inner tribes.”

 

Around this core of “Inner tribes” the mass of subjects was grouped — both in and outside the steppes — comprising “Outer tribes,” “Slave tribes,” and sedentary vassal states. “Outer tribes” had joined the federation only after the initial polity formation of the Türk Consequently, they were considered subjects but usually retained their native ruling clans (Golden 1992: 146). Conquered tribes, however, were considered “slaves.” Their ruling clans were often supplanted — either by an official of the khaganal government or a member of the Ashinas clan (in the latter case the “slave tribe” turned into a princely apanage). Outside the great steppes, the Türk pax (Golden 1992: 146) extended over the numerous oasis principalities south of the Tianshan and in the Indo-Iranian borderlands. As vassal states, their internal affairs remained mostly in the hands of local potentates. All subjects of the Türk bodun were forced to pay taxes or render services: nomads usually became conscripts and supplied horses, while oasis dwellers paid taxes and tributes to the Türk.

 

The political structure of the Türk Empire doubtlessly inherited much from the homeland of the Ashinas — the Chinese borderlands with its Xianbei and Xiongnu polities and (partly) Iranian-speaking populations — as well as from its predecessors in the steppes, particularly from the (little-known) polity of the Rouran (Golden 1992: 146). One key feature of the Türk Empire, namely its bipartite structure, dates back to the time of the Xiongnu Steppe Empire. This diverse heritage is also evident from the titles employed by the nobility of the Türk in governing their empire: at the top of the political system stood one or several khagans — a title that the Türk doubtlessly adopted from the Rouran and which is first attested among the Xianbei and the Tuyuhun. Initially, khagans presiding over the eastern wing of the Türk polity were considered to be superior in rank compared to those in the west. The homeland of the supreme ruler of the Türk in the east was often associated with a “holy” mountain area called ötükän (perhaps a generic term for the forested mountain pastures reserved for the supreme khagan of the Türk rather than a specific toponym). This underlined the sacral legitimation of sovereignty among the Türk: a khagan ruled “because heaven had commanded (so)” (tengri yarliqaduqin üchün) and he possessed “heavenly good fortune” (qut). To this end, the khagan held authority over the el, the realm, and promulgated the törü, the traditional, customary law, of the Türk (türk boduning elin törüsin tut- et-; Golden 1992: 147). This imperial ideology communicated the Türk, since the second half of the 8th century, in a series of inscriptions, written in a runic alphabet (perhaps derived from Sogdian), representing the first indigenous writing system in the Central Eurasian steppes (Wilkens forthcoming).

 

Below the khagan we find a series of offices and ranks, the precise hierarchical position and scope of duties of which appears not always clear to us. The sons of khagans bore the pre-Türkic (Hephthalite/Rouran?) title of tegin (“prince”). Immediately below the khagan ranked the yabghu — perhaps meaning something like “subordinate king,” an old title that seems to have its origins in the northern Chinese borderlands and which already appeared among the Türk prior to the establishment of their realm. Several more titles and honorific epithets frequently used by the Türk apparently had their origin in the Sino-Iranian-Tocharian milieu of these borderlands (e.g., sir < Skrt. sri – “lord” or “holy”; ishbara < Skrt. “lord”; shad < Soghd. ikhshed – “king”; Shadapit < Soghd. ikhshed + apit: “entourage of the shad”(?); beg < Soghd. bagha- “lord,” “god-like”). Others are of Chinese origin (tutuq < Chin. dudu) or seem to have their roots in the steppe world (Xianbei/Rouran), for instance, irkin, sengün, chor, elteber (all of them predominantly used for non-Ashinas chieftains of “Inner” and “Outer tribes,” the latter also for rulers of sedentary vassal states), or maghatur/baghatur (“picked warrior, hero”). Of particular interest with respect to the governance of the Turk Empire are the titles tudun and tarqan (both probably also inherited by the Türk from the Xianbei/ Rouran) as they seem to designate officials of the central administration: tarqans were, at least initially, officials of non-Ashinas descent often serving the khagan at his residence, while tuduns usually controlled “slave tribes” or supervised, throughout the empire, local rulers of vassal states (usually invested by the Türk as eltebers) as representatives of the khagan.

 

This abundance of titles among the Türk suggests that we are dealing here with a fully developed “nomadic state.” Further evidence for this comes from the role played by non-tribal features in the shaping of the polity of the Türk. One of these features is the institution of the comitatus — bands of personal retainers of (future) rulers all across the nomadic world of Central Eurasia, before and after the Türk. By way of success and charisma, ambitious aristocrats could attract a following of equally ambitious young men, incited by the prospect of material gain and social prestige. Membership in such retinues was not predefined by membership of a certain tribe or clan. Instead, it was based on personal bonds of loyalty between each member and the “leader” (often taking contractual forms and thus conceptually situated between patron–client relations and the notion of a “männerbund”). Such personal warriors, always at the chief’s disposition, usually form the core of the army and the nucleus of the (future) state. A classic example is provided by the re-establishment of Ashinas rule in the east under Qutlugh in 682/683, as narrated in the Kül Tegin inscription:

 

My father, the qaghan [i.e„ Qutlugh], went off with seventeen men. Having heard the news that (he) was marching off, those who were in towns went up mountains and those who were on mountains came down (from there); thus they gathered and numbered seventy men. Due to the fact that Heaven granted strength, the soldiers of my father, the qaghan, were like wolves, and his enemies were like sheep. Having gone on campaigns forward and backward, he gathered together and collected men; they all numbered seven hundred men. After they had numbered seven hundred men, (my father, the qaghan) organized and ordered the people… (Tekin 1968: 265).

 

Such personal retainers would serve their “leader” not only as close companions during battle, but also as his confidants, emissaries, and advisors — and as the military and economic resources at the leader’s disposal increased, their role could grow into that of generals, diplomats, and ministers (buyruqlar). Together with members of the “royal clan” (and often in opposition to them) they would constitute the bureaucratic nucleus of the “nomadic state.” All this we can — at least in contours—perceive to be the case in the Türk Empire. A fascinating example is the career of the above-mentioned Tonyuquq, who was a member of Qutlugh’s/Elterish Khagan’s 700-strong initial band of retainers and played — although not of Ashinas descent and only minor in rank (tarqan) — a hugely influential role as general and counselor during the reign of Elterish and his son Bilge Khagan, to the point that his daughter was married to the latter. Beyond clan and tribal loyalties acted also the many foreigners present at the various khaganal residences of the Türk — primarily the Chinese and Sogdians (Stark 2008: 293–314). The latter especially — probably since the very beginning of the Türk Empire—played a paramount role in building up a bureaucratic system, making Sogdian one of the literary languages at the Türkic courts. Sogdians were especially important for their Ashinas masters because of their diplomatic and mercantile skills. Between China and Byzantium they held a monopoly in organizing long-distance trade with and for the Türk (see below). Finally, there are hints that the Ashinas (like royal lineages in “steppe empires” before and after them), tried to replace tribal affiliations altogether by reorganizing clans and tribes into military units on the basis of groups of 10, 100, 1000, and 10 000. An example of such an attempt is apparently the on oq system of the western wing of the Türk Empire, the result of a reorganization of the various tribes under the sway of the Western Türk into ten tümen (units of 10 000 warriors), each originally under the command of a shad, that is, a member of the royal lineage.

A crucial condition for the creation and maintenance of relations of alliance and patronage — and thus for the very existence of the empire of the Türk — was the smooth and constant flow of the maximum possible revenues to the Türkic residences from within and beyond the steppes. These were acquired in various ways: plunder, tribute, taxes, diplomatic exchanges, and — not least — trade. The latter was organized and conducted on a transcontinental scale and along one of the main arteries of Eurasian exchange, the “Silk Roads,” by Sogdians in Türkic service — with horses, silver, fur, and silk as the main commodities. Thus, it comes as no surprise that with the establishment of the pax Turcica over most parts of the Eurasian steppes, political and economic exchange throughout the Eurasian continent intensified remarkably.

 

Although political unity among the Türk lasted no longer than approximately 30 years, the ideological and institutional legacy of their empire proved to be remarkably enduring. Most of the succeeding steppe polities were, to varying degrees, based on political traditions connected with the Türk. The Mongol world empire, especially, owed much of its imperial ideology and structures of governance to its predecessor some 700 years before.

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